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The Association between Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes 
and Cohort Fertility: Evidence from Brazil
Camila Ferreira Soares, Everton Emanuel Campos de Lima
Abstract: Brazil’s Bolsa Família Programme (BFP) aims to combat poverty and social 
inequalities through monetary transfers to families. A much-discussed indirect 
effect of the programme was its correlation to the fertility of the benefi ciary families. 
In this paper, we use a cohort fertility approach with parity progression ratios that 
differs from existing literature, which mainly used period fertility measures, to better 
understand the relationship between fertility and the BFP. This study analyses the 
relationship between the BFP and the reproduction of Brazilian women. We use data 
from the 2010 Brazilian micro-censuses, the only census after the start of the BFP in 
2004, to reconstruct the childbirth history of women with incomplete reproductive 
cycles (women aged 25 to 29), and estimate parity progression ratios (PPRs) and 
cohort fertility rates (CFR). In addition, we estimate propensity score matching (PSM) 
models comparing fertility outcomes of benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries of the 
programme. Our results show distinct differences in CFRs and PPRs. On average, 
BFP benefi ciaries had more children than women not covered by the programme. 
This fi nding remained consistent even after controlling for educational gradients 
and other covariates. Our empirical fi ndings show that women opt for a “rational” 
strategy, where they tend to have children in more rapid succession up until three 
children. These fi ndings contradict the recent literature that has not found any 
correlation between BFP and fertility. The results also suggest that cohort analyses 
may fi ll certain gaps left by previous studies of period fertility. This paper is one of 
a few that have analysed the relationship between a conditional income transfer 
programme and cohort measures in Brazil. 
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1 Introduction 
During the traditional process of demographic transition, mortality fi rst drops, 
followed by a decline in fertility as described by Notestein (1953). Brazil has not been 
an exception to this rule and its own transition followed this trend. First, mortality 
in the country fell by 35 percent in the 1940s and fell a further 25 percent in the 
following decade, while fertility remained essentially constant during the same 
period (Carvalho/Wong 1996). The beginning of Brazil’s fertility transition occurred 
only 30 years after mortality decreased. We note the speed of the Brazilian fertility 
decline in relation to developed countries, which took less than half a century to 
occur (Martine 1996; Patarra/Oliveira 1988; Merrick/Berquó 1983).
According to Carvalho et al. (1981), this rapid decline was due to changes in 
the reproductive behaviour of the lower social strata, and related to institutional, 
economic, social and cultural changes (Merrick/Berquó 1983; Faria 1989; Paiva 1987). 
Additionally, Faria (1989) highlights several structural and institutional changes that 
indirectly affected fertility behaviour. He linked the government policies of the mid-
1960s, such as increased consumer credit, investment in telecommunications, the 
establishment of a social security system and increased investments in health care 
as the main factors that created a demand for fertility control.
Beginning within higher socioeconomic groups of society, in 1991, the decline 
in fertility rates was more pronounced among the less educated and poorest – 
especially residents of the (traditionally poorer) northern and north-eastern regions 
of the country (Berquó/Cavenaghi 2005), resulting in a signifi cant reduction in 
fertility rates (IBGE 2010). In the following decades, the fertility reduction had been 
achieved by all socioeconomic groups in Brazil (Alves/Cavenaghi 2012). Today, 
despite Total Fertility Rates (TFRs) reaching rates below population replacement, 
signifi cant differences in fertility rates between the different social strata still exist 
in the country (Lima et al. 2018; Rios-Neto et al. 2018).
As we have noted, variables such as income and years of schooling are 
especially important for understanding developments in TFR, because these two 
variables present an inverse relationship with fertility only for women (Lesthaeghe/
Surkin 1988; Beaujouan et al. 2013; Berquó/Cavenaghi 2014; Becker 1991a/b). The 
situation is, however, more complicated in Brazil. According to an UNFPA report 
(2018), in 40 percent of the poorest households women have the average number 
of offspring above the reproduction level and at the ages of 20 to 24 years old. 
During the Brazilian fertility transition, reproductive behaviour varied greatly due to 
inequalities in income and education levels. However, unlike in developed countries 
where fertility was delayed with increases in education, in Brazil, increases in 
education levels did not cause women to delay having children (Wong/Bonifácio 
2009) and fertility became concentrated between the young ages of 15 and 24. 
Interestingly, these young mothers generally have children until a certain parity is 
achieved and then begin to control their fertility by opting for female sterilization as 
a primary method of contraception (Rios-Neto 2005).
Gupta and Leite (1999), using the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) from 
1986, 1991 and 1996, examined the trends and determinants of adolescent fertility 
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in the poorest Brazilian region: the Northeast. They found a strong relationship 
between years of schooling and the postponement of birth among adolescent 
women between the ages of 15 and 19 and this education effect has increased in 
the Northeast since these studies.
However, a reversal process was observed by the 2010 census and fertility 
began to be postponed slightly (IBGE 2010). We notice this process particularly 
among highly educated women (Lima/Myrskylä 2014; Lima et al. 2018; Rios-Neto 
et al. 2018). Nonetheless, adolescent motherhood remains common in the country. 
Cavenaghi (2013) meanwhile analysed the fertility of young Brazilian women 
according to education and income levels. The author found that young women 
(aged 15 to 19) with low socioeconomic status showed higher levels of fertility than 
those of the same age but with a higher economic status. 
The Bolsa Família Programme (BFP) was developed to fi ght poverty and income 
inequality among the Brazilian population. The programme consists of monetary 
benefi ts and is considered a conditional cash transfer programme due to certain 
commitments that benefi ciary families must fulfi l. For example, children and 
adolescents of families enrolled in the programme must attend school, and mothers 
must seek healthcare and social assistance for their children (Brasil 2013). On one 
hand, these conditions allow basic individual rights to reach families with very low 
per capita incomes, i.e., families with a per capita income below the national poverty 
line of R$140.00 per month. On the other hand, for those in extreme poverty, having 
children is not a requirement to receive this monetary benefi t (Campello 2013).
However, this social benefi t is generally destined for families with a per capita 
income that is slightly above the poverty line and for women with children aged 17 
or below. The BFP limits benefi ts to fi ve per family (e.g., maximum 3 children and/
or 2 adolescents, according to Law 10,836, dated 9 January 2004). Some authors 
therefore believe that this benefi t and its limits may infl uence a woman’s decision 
to have a child by affecting the fertility preferences and by reducing the opportunity 
costs of the child (Stecklov et al. 2006). 
Many demography issues can be discussed and analysed in the context of this 
social programme, including access to modern contraceptive methods, contact 
with health facilities, years of education and the inclusion of women from low 
socioeconomic groups into the formal labour force, which can be seen as a way 
to ensure women’s empowerment. Similarly, the programme raises a series of 
questions. For example, how might non-monetary benefi ts, such as those provided 
indirectly by the BFP, lead women to want fewer children? In addition, which factors 
related to this cash transfer programme may lead to changes in women’s decisions? 
In this study, we explore the relationship between cohort fertility levels, parity 
progression and receiving or not receiving the BFP benefi t in an attempt to answer 
the question: Does the BFP acts as pronatalist programme, e.g., increasing the 
chances of women to opt for an additional child? 
We used a different approach and a different dataset. We aim to perform an 
exploratory analysis, comparing cohort fertility levels from BFP benefi ciaries and 
non-benefi ciaries who are eligible for the cash transfer programme. We analyse 
incomplete cohort fertility and its relationship with the BFP, using the retrospective 
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children ever born information provided by the 2010 Brazilian census. This study 
will analyse the relationship between BFP benefi ciaries and several cohort fertility 
measures, such as average parity and parity progression ratios of benefi ciaries and 
eligible non-benefi ciaries of the programme. The latter is the only control group 
available because with the information available in the data we are not able to 
compare fertility levels before and after the start of the BFP. This group consists of 
women who do not receive the benefi t, but who also belong to an extremely low 
socioeconomic stratum with an income per capita below R$140.00 (corresponding 
to approximately 78 USD).
We note that the BFP was not designed to be evaluated in terms of treatment 
and control groups, which made defi ning these two groups a challenge. In fact, 
a municipality quota (or percentage) restricts the number of households able to 
receive the benefi t and consequently no control group exists (Oliveira/Soares 2013). 
Therefore, we were careful to conduct our analyses and separate our sample into 
groups that were as comparable as possible.
We estimated a series of parity progression ratios (PPRs) and cohort fertility rates 
(CFRs), focusing on the women who declare they are the head of the household 
at the time of the census interview. We also performed analyses controlling for 
education level and regional differences. Finally, to select random samples, we 
applied a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to our data, this time controlling for 
education level, region of residence and other relevant confounding variables. We 
used PPR and CFR measures because there is a lack of studies on the relationship 
between cash transfer programmes and cohort fertility. Although this approach 
presents some limitations due to the available data, we believe that this work is 
important and explores new avenues in this well-discussed topic in demographics. 
2 The Bolsa Família Programme 
The legislation for the BFP was introduced in October of 2003, as Provisional Measure 
No. 132, and converted into Law No. 10,836 in 2004. It provided for the unifi cation 
of various previous cash transfer programmes and specifi cally combined fi ve such 
programmes. 
Registration for the BFP is performed at the municipal level, through the Unique 
Registration (CadÚnico) for Social Programmes of the Federal Government. This 
registration platform is the gateway to all Brazilian social programmes, such as 
Bolsa Verde (Green Grant) and Minha Casa Minha Vida (My Home My Life). Created 
in July 2001, CadÚnico aimed to identify families with a monthly per capita income 
of up to half of the national minimum wage. In 2003, CadÚnico became the only 
means of accessing Brazilian social programmes, including the BFP.
In the 2010s, families with a per capita family income between R$70.01 and 
R$140.00 per month and with children up to 17 years of age and families with a per 
capita income below R$70.00 per month – even those without children – were eligible 
to receive the BFP benefi t. The value received through the benefi t is estimated by 
calculating a base value and several variable benefi ts that depend on the composition 
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of the family. Therefore, the BFP provides fi ve benefi ts in total: 1) one base value for 
families in extreme poverty; 2) a variable benefi t for children through the age of 15; 
3) a Youth Variable Benefi t, for 16- and 17-year-old adolescents; 4) a benefi t to help 
overcome extreme poverty; and 5) an extraordinary variable benefi t for families 
with monetary losses after migrating from other programmes to the BFP.
Certain benefi ts depend on the number of children per family, the per capita 
family income and the ages of the children. The base benefi t is for families living 
in extreme poverty – including families without children. The variable benefi t is 
intended for families with pregnant women and for mothers of children up to the age 
of 15, with a maximum of three benefi ts per family through 2011 and a maximum of 
fi ve benefi ts after 2011. Families with children between the ages of 16 and 17 who 
attend school can receive a maximum of two benefi ts per family. The fourth benefi t 
listed above is for families that remain below the extreme poverty line, even after 
receiving the benefi ts above (BRASIL 2004).
In 2010, families in extreme poverty (income below R$70.00 per month) could 
receive a base benefi t of R$68.00 and a maximum of three additional benefi ts of 
R$22.00 for each child through the age of 15. These families could also accrue two 
additional benefi ts of R$33.00 for any 16- or 17-year-old children. Based on these 
values, a family in extreme poverty could receive a maximum of R$200.00 per 
month. Meanwhile, households with monthly family incomes between R$70.01 and 
R$140.00 would not receive the base benefi t of R$68.00 and the maximum such 
families could receive from the social benefi t was R$132.00 (BRASIL 2013).
The selection of benefi ciaries is made by self-declaration of income by the head 
of household and registered in the CadÚnico database. This form of selection 
differs from most income transfer programmes in developing countries that use 
proxy means tests (PMT) to estimate the household income (Souza et al. 2018) by 
using multivariate regression to correlate proxies such as household expenditure or 
consumption (Kidd/Wylde 2011). Then, this income is verifi ed in the administrative 
records of the Federal Government. However, some families do not receive the 
benefi t because of a municipal quota and hence some families enter a waiting list. As 
soon as a family leaves the programme, the next person on the waiting list receives 
the benefi t. This system also implies that once the quota value is reached, for a 
family to enter the programme it is necessary that another leaves it. However, this 
system was not updated effi ciently until 2011 and sometimes families with incomes 
higher than the permitted value continued to receive the benefi t, a situation that 
made it impossible for another household to receive the BFP. In this case, the only 
way for families that were left out to enter the programme is via an increase by the 
Federal Government of the BFP budget available to the programme, thus expanding 
the municipality quota.
There are also many families with incomes below R$140.00 that are not registered 
in CadÚnico, possibly due to a lack of information, especially among women in rural 
areas. According to a report by CadÚnico (2013), 78 percent of registered families 
lived in urban areas, which have a lower proportion of extremely poor residents, 
while only 22 percent lived in rural areas. The place of residence and the degree to 
which women and families are informed are related to the household selection for 
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participation in the BFP. Since the programme is based on self-registration, families 
need to search for the place in their municipality to register in CadÚnico. In rural 
regions, generally the registration of families is more diffi cult because women may 
not be aware of this benefi t and where to register (Tavares 2010).
In this context, our aim is to further understand how these BFP conditions may 
– indirectly – affect the reproductive behaviour of women. In the next sections, we 
will discuss the data and estimates used to explore this relationship. 
3 Theoretical considerations and literature review
The studies about fertility and cash transfers fi nd support in the microeconomic 
theories of Becker (1960) and Schultz (1974, 1993) and establish arguments for 
understanding variations in fertility in developed countries. According to the 
theory used by Becker, parents behave rationally and their parenting decisions are 
oriented to maximize the utility of the children (Becker 1960, 1991a/b). Thus, family 
size is a function of the interaction between children’s quantity-quality and the 
usefulness of other consumer goods, which are related to income and prices. For 
Becker (1960), this trade-off between quantity and quality is strongly determined 
by income. With an increase in household income, both measures should increase; 
however, the elasticity of quantity is weaker than the elasticity of the child’s quality 
(Becker 1960). Specifi cally, with higher income, families choose to invest in what 
will improve the quality of the life of the child rather than invest in having multiple 
children. Becker (1991b) assumes that parents are altruistic towards their children. 
The utility function of the parents depends on their consumption and the utility of 
each child as well. For those women who invested in human capital, with higher 
education, and greater participation in the labour market, the opportunity cost will 
be higher, causing a drop in the number of children due to incompatibility between 
professional and maternal activities (Becker 1991a/b). The division of labour in a 
household takes place according to the specialities in the activities of each family 
member, which in many cases means a signifi cant part of household work goes 
to the woman within that labour division. However, with the increase in women’s 
labour force participation, their activities inside the family tend to reduce and thus, 
the decision to have a child can be also impacted (Becker 1991a).
According to Schultz (1974), the decision to have children depends on factors that 
are not only economic but also environmental – factors that can modify the idea of 
ideal family size. For Schultz (1993), conditionalities reduce the costs of investment 
in child quality, leading to a decrease in the number of children, considering the 
two goods as substitutes. We fi nd the arguments of Becker and Schultz to be 
extremely important for understanding the rationality of the quantity-quality 
trade-off of children among socioeconomic groups in extreme poverty. In another 
study, Becker and Lewis (1973) analysed the interactions between the quality and 
quantity of children and their effects on the demand for offspring. According to 
the authors, highly educated women prefer to increase the quality of their children 
rather than the quantity. Exploring the theory of Becker and Lewis (1973), Angrist 
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et al. (2010) found new evidence about the quantity-quality trade-off. They used 
different treatment groups and exogenous variations in family size, also considering 
the incidence of multiple births and the composition of family siblings of the same 
sex. According to them, the birth of twins causes an increase in parity numbers and 
also the preference for mixed sexes among siblings results in higher order births 
(Angrist et al. 2010).
In addition, the authors found no signifi cant effect on fertility levels after 
controlling for education and the labour market, that is, no evidence of a quantity-
quality trade off. Their approach is innovative, juxtaposing the results of multiple 
instrumental variable strategies to capture the effects of fertility for different groups 
of people (Angrist et al. 2010). However, the limitation of the study by Angrist et al. 
(2010) is that it does not capture the effect of one child.
Arguing from another perspective, Easterlin (1975) studied the macroeconomic 
aspects of reproductive control and cited three main determinants of fertility level: 1) 
the demand for children, 2) the potential output of children and 3) the cost of fertility 
control, including subjective and objective costs. The fi rst determinant of demand 
is infl uenced by preferences, prices and income. However, the author argues that 
subjective and social factors must also be considered in the demand for children.
Galor and Weil (1996) also investigated different mechanisms to explain the 
relationship between fertility and economic development. The authors consider 
three components: fi rst, the fertility decision is given by a function of the relative 
wages of men and women. The higher relative wages for women tend to increase 
the opportunity costs of children more than total household income, as pointed out 
by Becker (1991a). The second component is the population growth rate that affects 
the level of capital per worker. Finally, the level of capital per worker affects the 
relative wages of men and women. These three components form a cycle, thus an 
increase in capital raises the relative wages of women, which leads them to invest 
in the labour market rather than having children (Galor/Weil 1996). Thévenon and 
Gauthier (2011) suggest that even if they are not aimed at fertility, policies to tackle 
poverty (such as BFP) create favourable environments for motherhood because such 
social policies also reduce the costs of a child. In addition, Kalwij (2010) argues that 
such policies can increase complete fertility, creating stimulus for young women to 
make an early motherhood transition and increasing the likelihood of having more 
children during women’s reproductive period by reducing the costs of a child.
An increase in family income can reduce fi nancial constraints that work as an 
obstacle for families to desire more children (Luci-Greulich/Thévenon 2013; Becker 
1991b; Wesolowski/Ferrarini 2018). As income increases, bearing children becomes 
more manageable. This indicates that cash transfer programmes promote not 
only monetary benefi ts, but more access to health and education usually linked to 
the programme conditionalities, thus reducing the cost of a child, which in turn is 
assumed to infl uence fertility.
This theoretical economic background is important for understanding the rational 
choices behind fertility outcomes. Therefore, we expect that our data will show that 
the economic incentives provided by the cash transfer programme are associated 
with a couple’s decision whether to have an additional child. 
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3.1 Previous research in other Latin American countries
The conditions of certain cash transfer programmes in other Latin American 
countries – such as Chile Solidario (Chile), Juntos (Peru), Red de Protección 
Social – RPS (Nicaragua), Oportunidades/Progresa (Mexico), Families in Action 
(Colombia), Programa de Asignación Familiar – PRAF (Honduras) and Programme of 
Advancement through Health and Education – PATH (Jamaica), – are similar to those 
of the BFP (Stecklov et al. 2006). Studies have questioned how such programmes 
are related to the fertility of these nations. Stecklov et al. (2006) have explored this 
relationship in some of these countries, analysing the RPS, Progresa and PRAF 
programmes and their association with the number of children among benefi ciary 
women.
According to the authors, Progresa and RPS demonstrated no relation to 
fertility. However, the PRAF programme had a pronatalist profi le, presenting many 
incentives for women to raise children (Stecklov et al. 2006). Additionally, PRAF, 
similar to BFP, allows for an increase in benefi ts if the family has an additional child, 
whereas Progresa and RPS do not. After this study, PRAF formulators modifi ed the 
conditions of the programme to approximate those of Progresa and RPS, which in 
turn decreased the fertility incentive from PRAF (Stecklov et al. 2006). Using the data 
after the changes made to the PRAF, Li (2016) replicated the study by Stecklov et 
al. (2006) and she found an insignifi cant change in fertility levels due to the families 
being part of the programme. 
In a separate study, Garganta et al. (2017) analysed Argentina’s cash transfer 
programme, Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH), and its relationship to national 
reproduction rates. This programme also contains conditions that provide monetary 
benefi ts to women with up to fi ve children under the age of 18 and the authors 
found that the programme is related to an increasing family size until this limit of fi ve 
children was achieved. Interestingly, they found that in families with children over 
the age of six, this fi nancial support does not appear to encourage women to have 
another child. Moreover, the positive fi nancial incentive was higher among mothers 
with lower levels of education (Garganta et al. 2017). 
Outside of Latin America, Andersen et al. (2018) analysed the relationship 
between the Cash-for-Care (CFC) programme introduced in Norway in 1998 and 
changes in fertility behaviour among eligible versus ineligible mothers over a four-
year period. The results showed that the probability of having a second child was 
reduced and the programme caused a reduction in the total fertility levels of women 
(Andersen et al. 2018).
Signorini and Queiroz (2009), Rocha (2018), Simões and Soares (2012), and 
Cechin et al. (2015), Superti (2020), Olson et al. (2019), among others, used national 
household surveys to explore the relationship between the BFP and the country’s 
TFR. All studies found either little or no relationship between the social programme 
and fertility levels. Some even argued that the BFP had a negative impact on fertility 
in the two years after its implementation (Signorini/Queiroz 2009).
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3.2 Previous Brazilian studies
On the other hand, the positive results of the BFP on education and health in Brazil 
are already well known. Studies have shown that BFP participation increases the 
numbers of poor children and adolescents going to school (Araújo et al. 2010; 
Oliveira/Soares 2013; Simões/Soares 2012). In addition, the conditions of the 
programme in the area of education can help to decrease inequality in education 
and consequently reduce intergenerational cycles of poverty (Cireno et al. 2013). 
With respect to health, the programme has served to improve the nutrition of 
children, reduce child mortality from malnutrition, increase vaccination rates and 
provide greater access to health care for children (Camelo et al. 2009; Raselha et 
al. 2013). A study by Facchini et al. (2013) found a higher use of basic health units 
(BHUs) among benefi ciaries of the BFP, implying improved health care among those 
in the programme.
Carloto and Mariano (2010) argue that the fact that the BFP benefi t card contains 
the name of the woman creates a gender issue – specifi cally, it attributes the role 
of “family caregiver” to the woman and reinforces the stereotype of the female 
condition. In addition, the authors highlight certain issues attached to the conditions 
of the programme. First, they note that as women are the representatives of the family 
in the BFP, the women then wish to meet the conditions for the programme, which 
results in an increase in their family responsibilities (Carloto/Mariano 2010). This 
event is what Corgozinho (2015) refers to as the “feminization of care.” Meanwhile, 
Rego and Pinzani (2013) highlight several testimonials from BFP benefi ciaries who 
affi rm that the programme promoted a sense of citizenship, more autonomy within 
the family, engendered greater respect and encouraged better expectations for 
the future. Pires (2013) also argues that many benefi ciaries created a bond with 
the “external world” by complying with programme conditions, thus creating both 
confi dence that goes beyond consumption and greater autonomy within the home.
Several studies have focused on fi nding a link between the BFP and women’s 
fertility. For example, Rocha (2018) evaluated the programme by comparing fertility 
before and after the programme was implemented, using household surveys from 
1995 to 2007 from PNAD (Brazil’s household survey) and propensity score matching 
method. The author did not fi nd a positive relationship between fertility and the BFP. 
His explanation of this result is linked to the BFP enabling investments in the quality of 
children’s lives, in contrast to infl uencing the women’s desire to have more children 
(quantity). Other studies reinforced how the BFP indirectly provides assistance 
to its benefi ciaries in terms of health care, which facilitates women’s access to 
reproductive health information and contraception (Rocha 2018; Ribeiro et al. 2017). 
Meanwhile, some studies (previously cited) presented similar results (Simões/
Soares 2012; Signorini/Queiroz 2009), fi nding no relationship between fertility rates 
and BFP. In their studies, Simões and Soares (2012) used data from PNDS (National 
Demographic and Health Survey) from 2006, and Signorini and Queiroz (2009) used 
PNAD (National Household Survey) 2004 and 2006. Both studies applied a model 
based on a differences in differences approach to measure the correlation with the 
programme and fertility. However, Cechin et al. (2015) reached different conclusions 
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after analysing a longer period of exposure to the BFP and using 2010 census data. 
They found that the programme is slightly correlated with a woman’s progression 
from a fi rst to a second child (Cechin et al. 2015). Alves and Cavenaghi (2012) also 
argued for a likely relationship between the social benefi t and fertility based on 
the hypothesis of inverse causality. Specifi cally, an increase of one additional child 
reduces per capita family income; therefore, the family becomes eligible for the BFP. 
However, they do not demonstrate any substantial empirical analysis to prove their 
hypothesis. In contrast to our estimates, Superti (2020) using data from CadÚnico, 
the database that allocated BFP benefi ts, showed that BFP had no relationship with 
fertility decisions. In addition, Olson et al. (2019) study the relationship between 
Bolsa Família and teenage pregnancy (ages 15 to 18) using PNAD (Brazil’s household 
survey) from 2004 to 2013.They fi nd a reduction in teen pregnancies after the year 
2010. It is important to note that we are working with women from a very low social 
stratum, who fi nd an identity in maternity (Patias/Buaes 2012). The transition to 
motherhood for these women usually occurs earlier compared to other social strata 
(Vieira 2009). In addition, these women view maternity as something sacred and a 
ritual, considered a “gift from God” (Rego/Pinzani 2013). However, the lack of future 
fi nancial benefi ts could delay the passage to motherhood.
3.3 Hypotheses and assumptions
We propose that the benefi t of BFP, with the programme’s conditionalities, reduces 
a child’s opportunity cost. Therefore, the conditions of the BFP should operate as 
incentives to women to have more children and lead them to invest in quantity 
instead of quality as their income increases, because it provides to mothers a 
variable amount of money for each child born, with a maximum of 3 children up to 
the age of 15 years. To confi rm these results using another analytical method, we 
perform propensity score matching, the results of which we will discuss next. 
Our hypothesis is that the women who receive the BFP, even if this benefi t 
corresponds to a low monetary value, have more children compared to mothers in 
the same social stratum who are not benefi ciaries of the programme. In addition, 
we hypothesize that women in poor socioeconomic conditions that allow them to 
participate in the BFP already have higher fertility rates than other social classes. 
In this case, the BFP may act as an incentive to fulfi l these women’s desire to have 
children. Of course, another interpretation is also possible and they have more 
children as a way to gain some monetary relief from their poverty.
Given the data we use and according to our hypothesis, we expect to fi nd a positive 
correlation between the programme and fertility, with benefi ciaries displaying 
higher fertility. Unlike other studies previously mentioned here, we suggest that the 
programme conditions may also correlate with parities progressions in a different 
way. 
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4 Data and methods
We use reproductive and socioeconomic data from the 2010 Brazilian micro-census, 
provided by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). We tabulated 
the cohort fertility measures of BFP benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries based on 
family income information and whether or not they declared in the 2010 census 
that they receive the benefi t. We use the reproductive information on children ever 
born (CEB), separated by fi ve-year age intervals, educational level and region of 
residence. We also tabulate this information for all women in the aggregate, for 
only women who are heads of household. This last tabulation is important for our 
analysis, as heads of household are more likely to have children and also control the 
income of the household. 
Therefore, the aim of this study is to analyse the relationship between fertility and 
the BFP among different cohorts. To this end, we selected two groups of women: BFP 
benefi ciaries in 2010, between the ages of 15 and 49, and non-benefi ciaries from the 
same age group, despite being eligible for the programme. These non-benefi ciaries 
are women aged 15 to 49 whose per capita family income is below R$140.00 per 
month (the poverty line in 2010, as described in Fig. 1). One may argue that this 
analytical choice could create a selectivity bias yet this was the only feasible way 
that we saw to select the eligible women (our control group) and comparable to the 
BFP benefi ciaries. We also suggest that the propensity score matching applied in 
this study may reduce this selectivity issue, because it selects the groups randomly 
and with comparable characteristics and the only difference between them is in 
relation to whether or not they received the BFP. 
These women are eligible for the BFP, but for some unknown reason did not 
receive the benefi t that year. One possible reason for not receiving the benefi t 
may be linked to the municipal quotas. To select comparison groups, we used the 
following census microdata variables: women from fi ve-year age intervals; total 
number of CEB, grouped by the age of the mother; per capita family income; and 
whether or not the family has monthly income provided by the BFP. The sample 
includes 1,377,394 BFP benefi ciaries and 955,381 non-benefi ciaries.
Important points need to be addressed. First, the 2010 population census was 
the only data with reproductive and the social benefi t information after the start 
of the BFP in 2004. This dataset is still a good benchmark to analyse the proposed 
relationship between the benefi t and fertility because the families that enter the 
programme could continue for at least 2 years, even if their income increases due 
to household income volatility (Souza et al. 2018). In addition, every two years 
the family needs to update their registration information and the period of benefi t 
is restarted. In reality, in some municipalities families are unable to update their 
information in the required register (resulting in continuing the benefi t) (Soares/
Sátyro 2010). Secondly, even after voluntarily leaving the BFP, there is a 36-month 
guarantee period for families to return to the Bolsa Família if their fi nancial situation 
worsens (Barros et al. 2018). Thirdly, according to Souza et al. (2018), BFP is the best-
focused social programme in the country. The programme’s coverage between 2004 
and 2010 was around 50 percent among the poorest 20 percent of the population, 
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stabilizing at 60 percent of this population in 2012 (Souza et al. 2018). This good 
degree of focus is thanks to the selection criteria linked to the registered families 
and the number of quotas in the programme (Barros et al. 2008). 
4.1 Cohort fertility and parity progression ratio estimates 
Next, we reconstructed the birth history of women with incomplete reproductive 
cycles and estimated PPRs, which represent the proportion of women who progress 
from one parity to the next, or the share of women from birth order i, who progressed 
to birth order i + 1. PPRs can be calculated for cohorts of women defi ned either 
by their age or time of marriage. Generally, when studies divide women into age 
cohorts, parity progression ratios can be calculated from the parity distribution of 
a particular age group of women. These ratios are estimated as the proportion of 
women at a certain age interval with at least one child, divided by the total of women 
in that same age group, according to the formula below:
Where: 
•  5PPRx(i) is the parity progression ratio between parity i and i + 1;
•  5Mx(i + 1) is the proportion of women between x and x + 5 who reached 
parity i + 1;
•  5Mx(i) is the proportion of women between x and x + 5 who reached parity i.
The PPRs also allow us to fi nd the CFR, according to the formula:
CFR = PPR0 + PPR0 . PPR1 + PPR0 . PPR1 . PPR2 + …
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Additionally, for each comparison group, we initially estimated the CFR for 
cohorts with complete reproductive histories (women aged 45-49 years)1 and after 
incomplete reproductive histories (women aged 25-29 years). We note that the 
following tables and fi gures only show the results for women with an incomplete 
reproductive history (25-29 years). This is because the BFP began in 2004 and 
women aged 25 to 292 in 2010 were between the ages of 19 and 23 at the time of 
the programme’s implementation; and fertility was still considerably high in the 
recent periods for women aged 19 to 23 (Berquó/Cavenaghi 2014; Lima/Myrskylä 
2014; and Gupta/Leite 1999). Thus, older cohorts were less exposed to the relation 
between the BFP and fertility since a portion of their reproductive years had already 
been completed before the programme was implemented. The decision to follow 
this approach was based on previous studies about the relationship between Bolsa 
Família and fertility. For example, Cechin et al. (2015) have found differences in 
fertility levels between the programme benefi ciaries at the ages of 16 and 34 years 
old and Rocha (2018) has also shown fertility outcome differences between women 
aged from 26 to 35 years.
Moreover, as a household may include daughters, grandparents or other relatives 
who do not receive the benefi t or who are not mothers, we decided to include in 
our cohorts only the women who declared they were head of the household. These 
women represented almost 70 percent of the families who declared receiving the 
BFP in that period. An additional analysis was carried out including the men who 
declared they were head of the household, but the pattern of cohort fertility found 
did not change much in comparison with the households headed by women.3 The 
decision to work only with women heads of the household was considered to avoid 
the risks of selecting daughters (who also may be mothers) and other female relatives, 
avoiding counting the same benefi ts more than one time in a single household. In 
addition, households in Brazil have a long history of extended families (IBGE 2010) 
and daughters may constitute another family inside the same household, which, 
in turn, can bias the proposed comparison. This selection provides us with groups 
of women who may manage the fi nancial resources and care of the children in the 
family. This same age selection was performed by Cechin et al. (2015), Todd et al. 
(2012). Thus, we hope that this selection may raise other important highlights not 
illustrated by previous studies, such as the correlation with parities; in other words, 
the difference between the two groups according to birth orders. This new sample 
contains 399,500 women benefi ciaries who are responsible for the household 
(versus 205,260 non-benefi ciary heads of household). 
1 Not showed in this paper.
2 We have also tabulated CFRs and PPRs for complete reproductive (not shown), i.e., women who 
were ages 15 to 49. However, due to the large scope of our analyses, we limited our estimates 
to women aged 25-29 for reasons explained in the manuscript. Nonetheless, the results for all 
cohorts are quite similar in terms of PPRs.
3 Due to the length of analysis, these results are not shown in this work.
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Two important points must be addressed with regard to the cohorts of women 
who had already completed their reproductive years by the time the programme 
began: First, we assume no mortality differential by parity of older women. 
However, we avoid this problem by using the incomplete reproductive information 
from younger cohorts. Thus, measures derived from younger women may undergo 
both censoring and selection effects. This means that the comparison of the parity 
progression rates of younger and older women may sometimes be misleading 
(Moultrie 2013). Thus, we attempt to reduce this bias by selecting two groups that 
are easily comparable in terms of socioeconomic characteristics. Both groups fall 
under the poverty line (a condition to receive the benefi t) and differ only in terms of 
whether or not they receive the benefi t, which should help in reducing the selectivity 
effect.
4.2 Propensity Score Matching estimates
Programmes like BFP are diffi cult to separate into comparison groups, due to 
the design of the programme itself. Despite that fact, a strategy to contour this 
problem would be to use quasi-experimental estimators. In this study, we sought 
to comprehensively investigate the relationship between fertility and the social 
programme by applying propensity score matching to separate the control and 
treatment groups and estimate the difference between the two groups in relation to 
the number of children ever born.
PSM relates to the conditional probability of assignment to a particular treatment 
group based on observed covariates (Rosenbaum/Rubin 1983). The method 
generally uses a logistic regression, probit or logit, to calculate the propensity 
scores, according to equation 3:
e(xi) = pr(zi = 1|xi)
The function e(xi) is called the propensity score, which is the propensity for 
exposure to treatment i given the observed covariates xi (Rosenbaum/Rubin 1983). 
The treatment indication is denoted as zi, where zi = 1 are the units that receive 
treatment, and zi = 0 otherwise. 
The PSM is used to perform the balancing scores, selecting a control group with 
a propensity score similar to that of the treatment group, eliminating the selection 
bias of the study. For counterfactual estimation, the similarity between groups is a 
basic requirement, which is guaranteed by propensity score matching (Cechin et 
al. 2015). Given a variable of interest, the method is designed to observe if there is 
a difference between control and treatment groups, e.g., in terms of the number 
of children ever born in the case of this study. For this, the Average Treatment 
effect (ATT) is calculated, described in equation 4, where r1 is the response for the 
treatment group and r0 the response for the control group. This measure gives the 
estimate a correlation of the programme under analysis on the cohort fertility levels 
(Cechin et al. 2015; Rosenbaum/Rubin 1983):
(3)
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ATT = E(r1|z = 1) – E(r0|z = 0)
We estimate PSM models, controlling for women’s education level, region of 
residence, household location, age, race/ethnicity, if the women live with a partner, 
the type of union, occupation and their religion. All of these variables are well 
explored in other studies of fertility differentials (Gupta/Leite 1999; Marteleto/Souza 
2012; Marteleto 2010; Merrick/Berquó 1983). Reinforcing that, for the reasons 
already cited, the models are estimated for the selection of women aged 25 to 
29 years old and heads of household. We consider that these women control the 
family fi nances and they are the ones at greater risk showing some relation with the 
programme (Cechin et al. 2015).
One PSM method’s limitation is that it allows the user to work only with observable 
variables. Unobservable variables can also correlate with the woman’s decision 
to have children and differences in the number of children ever born cannot be 
explained only by whether the woman receives the Bolsa Família social benefi t. To 
assess the correlation of unobservable variables with the PSM model, Rosenbaum 
(2002) suggests a sensitivity test, or Rosenbaum’s limit, which tests the robustness 
of the propensity score matching results. According to the test, if the odds ratio is 
equal to 1, this implies that there is no selection bias and the difference between the 
control and treatment groups is explained by the Bolsa Família programme. 
5 Results
The results are presented in two subsections. First, we show the results for the 
cohort of women between the ages of 25-29 years who are head of the household, 
separated by region and educational levels. In both analyses, we estimated the 
PPRs and CFRs. Second, we present the propensity score matching analysis, this 
time controlling for more confounding factors. 
5.1 Descriptive analysis of PPRs and CFRs
Table 1 presents a descriptive analysis of the two comparison groups, according to 
certain socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Most of these benefi ciaries 
and non-benefi ciaries are located in the poorest, north-eastern region of the country. 
As shown in Table 1, in the group of benefi ciaries most women are spouse/partner 
to the head of the household. However, among non-benefi ciaries, the percentage 
of spouses/partners and children are very similar (both near 33 percent). The share 
of heads of household in both benefi ciary and non-benefi ciary groups are similar 
(29 percent and 21.48 percent, respectively). 
Meanwhile, the percentage of women by cohabitation is similar among 
benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries. We also found that women living in urban 
areas account for the majority of households in both groups. We did not notice any 
signifi cant differences between the two groups in terms of ethnicity.
(4)
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Tab. 1: Socioeconomic, demographic, and geographic characteristics: cohort 
ages 25 to 29, BFP benefi ciaries versus non-benefi ciaries, Brazil, 2010
BFP Non-BFP Differences
women women BFP – Non-BFP
in %
Relationship to household head
Head 29.00 21.48 7.52
Spouse/Partner of Head 55.54 33.60 21.94
Child 10.52 33.29 -22.77
Other Relative 4.47 10.28 -5.81
Other 0.46 1.34 -0.88
Total 100 100  
Type of union
Civil and Religious 14.33 18.95 -4.62
Civil Only 15.34 14.47 0.87
Religious Only 6.16 3.69 2.47
Union by Cohabitation 64.17 62.89 1.28
Total 100 100  
Race/ethnicity
White 26.62 34.14 -7.52
Black 10.03 9.35 0.68
Asian 1.37 1.22 0.15
Mixed-Race 61.12 55.01 6.11
Indigenous 0.86 0.28 0.58
Total 100 100  
Household location
Urban 69.25 76.8 -7.55
Rural 30.75 23.2 7.55
Total 100 100  
Education level
Incomplete Primary 55.93 43.86 12.07
Primary Education 23.27 21.58 1.69
Secondary/Tertiary Education 20.79 34.57 -13.78
Total 100 100  
Brazilian regions
North 12.4 14.89 -2.49
Northeast 54.16 39.3 14.86
South 6.94 6.83 0.11
Southeast 21.0 33.16 -12.16
Midwest 5.49 5.82 -0.33
Total 100 100  
N 1,377,393 955,381  
Source: Own calculation based on data from 2010 Brazilian Population Census.
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Regarding education levels, we found that benefi ciaries present a higher 
percentage of women with an incomplete primary school education in comparison 
to non-benefi ciaries. Likewise, 44 percent of benefi ciaries completed primary 
school, compared to 56 percent of non-benefi ciaries. For this reason, we have 
tabulated PPRs and CFRs according to education levels to identify how differentials 
in education affect the relationship between cohort fertility and whether or not a 
household receives the social benefi ts.
When analysing the benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries regionally, we fi nd that 
the majority of BFP benefi ciaries are concentrated in the Northeast (54 percent). 
This is consistent with offi cial estimates from the national statistics offi ce, which 
showed this region as having the highest percentage of the population living below 
the poverty line, followed by the Southeast, North, South and Midwest (IBGE 2010).
We compared the PPRs among BFP benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries (although 
eligible for the BFP) in 2010, for heads of household. Figures 2 and 3 show the PPRs by 
educational level and regions. With respect to CFRs, rates in the whole country were 
higher for benefi ciaries than for non-benefi ciaries, at 2.42 versus 1.81, respectively. 
This represents a notable difference (equal to 0.61) in reproduction between the two 
groups, as fertility varies from above replacement level for benefi ciaries to below 
replacement for non-benefi ciaries.
We fi nd the same pattern of increasing PPR up to the third parity when we 
disaggregate our analyses by education level. We used the following educational 
categories: did not complete primary school, completed primary school and 
completed secondary or secondary and tertiary school. (We grouped those that had 
completed secondary and tertiary school, since the two presented few cases.) We 
found that women with an incomplete primary level education demonstrated the 
highest CFRs (2.71 and 2.35 for benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries, respectively). 
Meanwhile, women who had completed secondary school or higher presented the 
lowest cohort fertility levels (1.79 and 1.05 for benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries, 
respectively), both below population replacement. Cross-group comparisons also 
showed that, disregarding educational level, BFP benefi ciaries present consistently 
higher CFRs than non-benefi ciaries. The results of the PPR analysis were even more 
insightful. Benefi ciaries showed a consistently higher PPR until the birth of a third 
child, after which the PPRs of benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries converged, even 
when controlling for education levels. 
In Figure 3, we analyse how the fertility estimates are correlated geographically. 
Brazil is historically a country characterized by extreme inequality, in part 
determined by place of residence (Berquó/Cavenaghi 2004; IBGE 2010). The north 
and north-eastern areas of the country are less developed in comparison with the 
southern and south-eastern regions and BFP benefi ciaries are concentrated in the 
Northeast (Table 1). As a result, one would expect to fi nd regional differences in 
cohort fertility measures between benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries, due to well-
known differences in fertility rates across Brazilian regions (Berquó/Cavenaghi 
2014). However, we did not fi nd signifi cant differences in PPRs between the two 
groups across regions. Instead, we found a consistent pattern in all regions, 
which implies similar conclusions to those of the previous analyses by education 
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level – specifi cally, regardless of the region where the household is located, the 
benefi ciaries show a slightly higher fertility, up until the birth of a third child and that 
the progression to having another child is less determined by the social programme. 
As a hypothetical scenario, we simulate the country’s fertility if all women heads 
of household in Brazil received BFP benefi ts, we extrapolated the relationship of 
the BFP based on CFRs and the percentage of women BFP benefi ciaries in the 
country in 2010. The fertility rate for women heads of household, ages 25 to 29 
(both benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries) in 2010 was 1.38, while the fertility rate 
for only benefi ciaries in the same age group was 2.45. As benefi ciaries of the 
programme represented 21.96 percent of the total number of women ages 25 to 
29, 21.96 percent of this CFR of 1.1 is attributed to women who received the BFP. If 
Fig. 2: PPRs for women heads of household, cohort ages 25 to 29, by 
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* Non-benefi ciary, but eligible. The values in parentheses correspond to the CFR.
Source: Own calculation based on data from 2010 Brazilian Population Census.
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Source: Own calculation based on data from 2010 Brazilian Population Census. 
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we extrapolate and suppose that 50 percent of the women in the age group were 
benefi ciaries, the new cohort fertility rate would increase to 1.76 (an increase in CFR 
of roughly 28 percent), which would in turn be a considerably high correlation with 
reproduction in the country. 
Our results appear to indicate that the quality-quantity trade-off operates inversely 
for women in fragile economic positions in society. Therefore, the conditions of the 
BFP operate as incentives to women to have more children and lead them to invest 
in quantity instead of quality as income increases, because it provides to mothers a 
variable amount of money for each child born, with a maximum of 3 children up to 
the age of 15 years. To confi rm these results using another analytical method, we 
perform propensity score matching, whose results we will discuss next.
The initial step was to perform logistic regression, given the set of variables 
described in the data section, and to fi nd the propensity scores. Once we estimated 
the propensity scores, the next step was to calculate the ATTs (as described in 
Table 2). The PSM models are estimated for CFRs and PPRs separately. The fi rst 
analysis covers only the cohort fertility and the second aims to understand the 
parity progression ratios to distinguish birth orders.
For overall cohort fertility, the ATT show a value of 0.531. This means that for 
women heads of household between 25 and 29 years old who received the BFP, their 
CFR will be on average 0.531 higher than that of non-benefi ciaries with the same 
characteristics. This result is close to previous fi ndings of CFRs and the differences 
in the number of children ever born was 0.61 (2.42 for benefi ciaries versus 1.81 for 
non-benefi ciaries). This means that, despite the explanatory power of the observed 
covariates, the BFP still presented a positive correlation with women’s cohort 
fertility.
If we look at the PPRs estimates, we see the same positive relationship between 
the number of children ever born and receiving BFP. Once more, the results are 
consistent with the descriptive analysis, showing that women benefi ciaries have 
higher PPRs and reducing this difference while we progress to higher birth orders. 
The threshold of three children is again observed this time. 
Tab. 2: ATT estimation – head of household, age groups 25 to 29, Brazil, 2010
CFR PPR 0-1 PPR 1-2 PPR 2-3 PPR 3-4 PPR 4 +
Benefi ciary 49405 11345 26552 28886 13369 4773
Non-benefi ciary 49405 11345 26552 28886 13369 4773
(129585) (88090) (69973) (36722) (18200) (9174)
ATT 0.531 0.226 0.121 0.071 0.033 -0.013
S. E 0.0086 0.0045 0.0042 0.0046 0.0062 0.0185
Note: Values in parentheses are the number of observations before PSM. 
Source: Own calculation based on data from 2010 Brazilian Population Census.
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For the progression from childless status to one child the difference is almost 
22 percent in favour of women benefi ciaries. While the progression from one to 
two children this value is 12 percent and then it declines to 7 percent when women 
bore a third offspring. In addition, for higher parity progressions this value is much 
lower, implying less signifi cant differences between BFP benefi ciaries and non-
benefi ciaries. 
A word of caution is necessary: Despite these differences in fi ndings, a number 
of unobserved factors may affect the assignment to the treatment group. Therefore, 
Rosenbaum sensitivity tests were performed on each model. These tests indicate 
that there is a critical gamma level at which the results of our models would be 
questionable. In other words, this critical value raises the question about the validity 
of the positive correlation of BFP with the cohort fertility. In our models, the critical 
gamma values for the Rosenbaum test were reached at 1.7 for PPR1-2, 1.4 for PPR2-
3, 1.3 for PPR3-4 and 1.15 for PPR4 +. For the CFR and PPR0-1, until the gamma value 
of 2.0, no critical value was achieved.
In order to reject our results for the PPR1-2, for example, the value of 1.7 indicates 
that an unobserved covariate or covariates would increase the odds of a treated 
woman progressing to a second child relative to a matched control woman by 
70 percent. Regarding the selected set of variables well explored in many fertility 
studies and used in our propensity score models, it may be unlikely that there 
are unobserved factors beyond these variables that would increase the odds of 
bearing an additional child between matched mothers by an additional 70 percent. 
Considering the PPR2-3 and the PPR3-4, the odds of parity progressions between 
matched women would increase in 40 percent and 30 percent, also making these 
values implausible. Looking at higher birth orders of four or more children, we see 
an increase in uncertainty of our estimates. But 15 percent is still a considerable 
value to doubt the model estimates.
6 Discussion
From our estimates, we found a similar pattern of reproduction among BFP 
benefi ciaries, particularly at the younger ages of 15 to 29, where women tended to 
have their fi rst through third children quickly, which allowed each family to receive 
a maximum of three variable benefi ts for each child from 0 to 15 years (according 
to the conditions of the BFP through 2011). Moreover, with increases in years of 
schooling, the disparity between benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries increases in 
birth orders 0-1 and 1-2. Our analyses at the highest educational level presented 
outliers and inconsistent estimates due to the small number of observations. We 
also note that eligibility for the programme can change over time and therefore may 
not have a correlation with higher educational groups.
However, the PPRs demonstrated similar patterns and differentials in fertility for 
the two groups at the national level and also when disaggregating the analysis by 
region and education level. An additional analysis with PSM confi rms our CFRs and 
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PPRs results, showing a positive correlation with the number of children among BF 
benefi ciaries as compared to non-benefi ciaries (who are eligible for the BFP).
According to the general microeconomic theory of fertility, an increase in income 
results in the decision to have fewer children, followed by a greater investment in 
human capital or child quality, according to the quantity-quality trade-off (Becker 
1960, 1991a/b). In the case of benefi ciaries, this rationality was not directly dictated 
by this trade-off. For the groups within our study, the rational decision could be to 
have more children so that the family income would increase due to an increased 
number of benefi ts. Our study is compatible with this hypothesis and showed 
that women may opt for a “rational” strategy. They are having children earlier to 
receive the associated monetary benefi t and then they begin to control fertility once 
reaching the allowable limit of children under the BFP. 
Another explanation for our fi ndings could be that we are working with women 
from a very low social stratum who fi nd their identity in maternity (Patias/Buaes 
2012). The lack of future fi nancial certainty may delay the passage to motherhood 
and the monetary benefi ts from the BFP can provide a better assurance of the future 
and monetary security that may encourage women to have children.
However, regardless of years of schooling, the BFP appears to have a positive 
correlation with women’s fertility up to a third child. One plausible explanation 
for this fi nding may be related to the conditions of the programme. Specifi cally, 
mothers receive a monetary supplement for each child, with benefi ts limited to 
three children through the age of 15. Consequently, women appear to have children 
to receive the per-child benefi t until they have three children. Moreover, we could 
argue that rationality among those in the poorest social strata in the country may 
not be directly dictated by the quantity-quality trade-off, as Becker (1960,1991a/b) 
predicted. Instead, for these women, the rational decision would be to have more 
children, as this will increase the household income until a capped number of 
monetary benefi ts.
We fi nd it important to highlight that the purpose of this study was not to measure 
the impact of the BFP on fertility, but to perform a relationship analysis based on 
PPRs and cohort fertility, neither of which has been used so far in the literature to 
study the relationship between fertility and the BFP. 
7 Limitations and challenges
However, caution is necessary in interpreting these results since this analysis has 
certain limitations. The fi rst is related to the diffi culty in establishing the exact 
moment that the woman begins to receive the benefi t – specifi cally, the beginning 
of the association of the BFP with reproduction. With information from the census, 
even with other available databases such as CadÚnico, we only know whether a 
woman received the benefi t or not in 2010. However, we do not know if the family 
entered the programme before or after having children. Another important question 
that needs to be addressed is about the possible existence of reverse causality. That 
is, with this study design, we cannot control the fact that the women may have many 
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children to receive the benefi t or if they already have children and therefore receive 
the BF. The second limitation, a consequence of the fi rst, refers to the question 
of causality. Establishing causality between the BFP and fertility is not possible, 
especially because the programme was not designed to be quasi-experimental (i.e., 
with clear distinction of control and treatment groups). Our estimates are based on 
cross-sectional data and we cannot conclude cause and effect, but rather certain 
associations between the BFP and fertility. 
The third limitation is related to the fact that a number of unobserved factors 
(not captured by our data) play a role in a woman’s decision to have a child, such 
as the individual desire to be a mother, the lack of access and information about 
contraception, the absence of knowledge of family planning commonly seen among 
low socioeconomic groups, etc. However, many other variables impact a woman’s 
decision to have children and should therefore be tested. 
A fourth limitation refers to BFP rules that allow families living in extreme poverty 
to have access to the benefi t even without children and that can create confounding 
effects as well. Finally, our analyses were based on PPRs from the age group of 25 
to 29; however, ideally we would use an age group at the end of the reproductive 
period – women 15 through 49.
In addition to the issue of BFP not having a quasi-experimental design, we are 
faced with a data problem. The fact that we do not know the exact moment the 
woman entered the programme means we do not know if she had fi rst a child and 
therefore she fulfi lled the BFP criteria, as a consequence of reductions in household’s 
per capita income due to the increase in the number of family members, or if this 
woman’s children were born after her entering the BFP, characterizing a reverse 
causality issue. With the data available in Brazil (household surveys or population 
census) that include fertility information and questions about BFP, we cannot 
establish the exact direction of this relationship between BFP and fertility. Finally, our 
analyses were only in relation to education. However, many other socioeconomic 
variables that might correlate with fertility should be tested. Therefore, we continue 
our analysis by studying regional differences in PPRs.
Despite all this, the robustness of our estimates provides interesting results and 
offers a different perspective on the much-discussed topic of fertility and BFP. A 
fi nal limitation to be aware of is the selectivity effect. The group of non-benefi ciaries 
appears to include women with a higher educational level and living in the most 
developed region of the country, the Southeast. PSM was used precisely as an 
attempt to reduce this problem, even though it is known that the method may not 
capture all selectivity.
Even though it is not possible to establish causality between fertility and BFP, 
this study presents an important contribution to the discussion concerning the 
relation between cash transfer programmes and fertility. First, because we clearly 
verifi ed differences in cohort fertility levels between women that receive the 
benefi t and those eligible that did not participate in the Bolsa Família Programme. 
Additionally, we saw a positive correlation between the BFP and parity progressions 
that extended up to the third child, something not explored before. As a result, 
the only unanimous conclusion in all studies on fertility and social programmes is 
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the complexity of analysing this relationship. Therefore, more analyses must be 
performed in this area. 
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